Putin’s War in Ukraine has Created a New and Very Different Ethnic Russia Diaspora in Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 2 – In 2022, 400,000 Russians fled to Kazakhstan and many observers predicted they would create enormous problems for that Central Asian country. But now roughly three-quarters have moved on to other countries or returned to Russia, and the 100,000 ethnic Russians who have stayed now form a new and very different diaspora, Igor Klevtsov says.

            In an article in The Times of Central Asia, the Russian journalist says that despite initial fears, the original mass arrival “did not damage Kazakhstan’s economy” and that those who have remained are making a valuable contribution to it (timesca.com/how-the-russian-relocation-wave-reshaped-kazakhstans-economy/).

              The influx of Russians “brought not only capital but also the consumption habits of Russai’s megacities.” Their wealth pushed up housing prices and led to the gentrification of major Kazakhstan cities, but their skills both directly contributed to the economy and became a model for Kazakhs.

              There is some tension between indigenous Kazakhs and the new Russian diaspora over jobs, but the attitudes of the ethnic Russians who remain are very different than many might have expected. Many are learning Kazakh, “not just as a practical necessity but also as a gesture of respect.”

              This sets the new Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan apart: “Unlike earlier migration waves marked by colonial overtones, today’s arrivals tend to reject imperial narratives and express respect for local culture.” They are increasingly well-integrated and “a significant share” of them are likely to remain in Kazakhstan even after Putin’s war in Ukraine is over.

Nearly 90 Percent of Russian Government Infrastructure Projects Currently Not Completed on Budget or on Time, Accounting Chamber Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – Vladimir Putin and his regime often announce major transportation projects, and all too often those announcements and the time of completion and budget are treated as if they are a certainty. But a new Accounting Chamber study finds that almost 90 percent of government infrastructure projects aren’t completed on budget or on time.

            Moscow’s announcements of its plans typically receive widespread coverage, but the failure of contractors to meet deadline and stay on budget does not. As a result, it appears to many that the situation with regard to infrastructure construction is much better than it in fact is (ng.ru/economics/2025-12-03/1_9393_documentation.html).

            These failures to meet announced goals are hitting both projects Moscow has identified as “projects of the decade” and local jobs such as the reconstruction of bridges in small settlements without which residents numbering in the hundreds of less are forced to suffer for months or even years. 

            Frequently, Nezavsimaya Gazeta says in reporting the Accounting Chamber study, after great projects have been announced, “it suddenly turns out that construction is impossible” at anything like the initially advertised costs because problems at the site make any such project “impossible” from the very beginning.  

            Such problems continue to arise, the Chamber says, because Moscow is currently funding only one percent of the inspectors at sites that Russian law requires, something that means local political figures report that everything is fine because no one is doing the monitoring needed to tell them differently in a timely fashion.

 

After War in Ukraine, Moscow will Strengthen Its Position within Its Sphere of Influence but That Sphere Will Be Smaller,’ Beijing Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Zhou Bo, a retired PLA colonel and now a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy, says that once the war in Ukraine ends, Moscow will strengthen its position in what it defines as its sphere of influence but that that sphere will become smaller than it was before 2022.

            The Chinese security analyst and commentator made that comment in the course of a South China Morning Post article about great power relations and the Taiwan issue (scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3334626/taiwan-complicated-issue-way-out-simple-ex-pla-colonel-zhou-bo).

            Not surprisingly, given Moscow’s increasing dependence on Beijing, Moscow media have picked up on precisely this point, one that many Russians will read as an indication that China believes almost any outcome of the Russian war will be at best mixed for the Russian leadership and may be worse than that.

            On the one hand, Zhou Bo’s argument suggests that many in Beijing believe that Moscow will recover some if not all of the influence it has lost during the war in the former Soviet space. But on the other, it also means that from China’s point of view, Moscow is not going to be the world power with influence across the globe that Putin clearly seeks. 

            If the Chinese analyst is correct, that would likely mean that Moscow would dramatically increase its attention to the former Soviet space, a move that could bring it into conflict with other powers but that elsewhere Moscow would see a continuing decline of its positions, a trend that could allow China as well as others to try to fill the void. 

Russian Children asked to Make Amulets Ostensibly to Protect Russian Soldiers in Ukraine But in Fact to Unite Population Behind Putin’s War There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 3 – Schools across the Russian Federation are now asking children to come up with home-made amulets ostensibly to be sent to Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine and protect their lives, Aleksandra Arkhipova says; but in fact, this campaign is a way to force children and their parents to identify with Putin’s war.

            According to the independent Russian anthropologist, this reflects “a new Russian reality” in which children are being asked to do even more than their parents to show their loyalty to Putin’s policies (t.me/anthro_fun/3712 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/novaya-normalnost).

            The word “amulet” itself is significant, Arkhipova continues. “It became widespread after 2022” for some as something magical but for most “’a handmade item for the front,’” that in many cases likely hasn’t even been sent to its supposed addressees but that reinforces “the one-sided emotional connection between children and soldiers.”

            This is not the first time the Russian anthropologist has discussed this issue. In 2023, she commented on reports that Tuvan leaders were sending amulets based on Baron Ungern, the anti-Soviet leader in Mongolia during the Russian civil war (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/amulets-which-saved-baron-ungern-from.html).

            At that time, she suggested that amulets were being used as part of an effort “to show that this war is not for territory, not for a land corridor to Crimea, but rather a holy and even divine war,” one in which the Kremlin wants people to become convinced that “God is on the side of Russia.”

Migrants from Central Asia in Russian Federation Deeply Split along Ethnic Lines, Kotkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 28 – Most Russian discussions about migrant workers and their families in the Russian Federation treat them almost as an undifferentiated whole, Kirill Kotkov says; but in fact, they are deeply split along national lines, do not like one another, and “to speak crudely, they are dividing Russia up into spheres of influence.

            The head of the St. Petersburg Center for the Study of the Countries of the Far East says that those who have come from Uzbekistan work primarily in the service sector while thse from Tajikistan work instead in construction, an arrangement that “is creating favorable conditions for the appearance of organized criminal groups” (svpressa.ru/society/news/492608/).

            These nationally distinct immigrants, Kotkov continues, thus represent not just a threat to Russians, especially if they number more than five percent in any city or region, but also to each other as they struggle to expand their positions in the Russian economy in the course of competing for work.

            In his remarks, Kotkov does not address another aspect of this situation: the experiences of these various national segments of the Central Asian migrants now in Russia may make them more nationalistic and thus become a problem for relations in their home countries when they eventually return there.

            A decade ago, Russian and Central Asian scholars pointed to the way in which migrants from Central Asia were being radicalized in Islamic terms by their experiences in Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/gastarbeiters-in-russia-contributing-to.html  and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/11/isis-finds-it-easier-to-recruit-central.html).

            That trend has received relatively less attention in recent years, but Kotkov’s observations suggest the ethnic radicalization of such migrants has replaced that earlier phenomenon and may prove to be an even larger problem for the Russian Federation now and for the countries of Central Asia in the future. 

Putin’s Latest Tax Reform May Deprive Russians in Rural Areas of Pharmacies, Their Last Source of Medical Assistance

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – In the name of “optimization,” the Putin regime has closed hospitals and medical points in many rural areas, arguing that there simply aren’t enough people served there to justify the state’s maintenance of these facilities. Now a Putin tax reform may deprive rural residents of their last source of medical assistance, the pharmacies.

            At the end of November, the Kremlin leader signed into law new requirements that small businesses pay VAT at much lower thresholds than in the past and hire bookkeeping staff to ensure that that all taxes owed are paid (moscowtimes.ru/2025/12/01/v-soyuzfarme-predupredili-o-massovom-zakritii-aptek-iz-za-povisheniya-nalogov-a181524).

            But this new arrangement is likely to force many pharmacies located in rural areas to close because their profit margins are so small. Maria Litvinova, director of the Pharmacy Union, which unites some 4,000 pharmacies in 47 regions, says the future of public health in the regions depends on having the new law modified with respect to pharmaceutical outlets.

            That is because rural Russians, who no longer have easy access to doctors and medical care, have come to depend on pharmacies to keep themselves healthy. If the pharmacies are forced to close, this group of the population will lose than possibility and diseases and deaths will both increase significantly.

Even Traditionally Pro-Russian Kyrgyzstan May Turn Away from Moscow, Dubnov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Moscow is rapidly losing influence among the countries of the former Soviet space to the point that even those countries like Kyrgyzstan which traditionally have been among the most pro-Russian may turn against Moscow in the future given its increasingly nationalistic course and ability to find support from other outside powers.

            That is the conclusion of Arady Dubnov, a Russian commentator who specializes on Central Asia, and who implies in a new article that the time when that will happen in Bishkek may be sooner than anyone now suspects (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/4072-аркадий-дубнов,-политолог,-эксперт-по-центральной-азии).

            He notes that in the newly elected parliament, there will not be any ethnic Russians, something that is “completely logical given that the Russian community [in Kyrgyzstan now] does not exceed three percent of the total population.” Moreover, deputies are required to know Kyrgyz, a rarity among even that three percent.

            At present, Dubnov continues, “a significant number of the urban population of Kyrgyzstan, especially among those who are older, knows Russian well.” And for that reason among others, Bishkek has “traditionally been the most, if you like, ‘Russia-centric’ in Central Asia.”

But, he says pointedly in conclusion, that is “for the time being” and not something Moscow can count on as something that will always be the case.