Three Distinct Groups Form Russian Opposition to Putin’s War in Ukraine, ‘Chronicles Project’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 10 – The share of Russians who oppose Putin’s war in Ukraine has stayed remarkably stable since 2022 at about 20 percent; but this segment of the population is not the monolith many think, Vsevolod Bederson, a researcher at the Chronicles Project says. Rather they consist of three groups which together form a complex mosaic.

            Just under half of this 20 percent (45 percent) form the core of consistent peace supporters, he says surveys show. These people oppose the war, give priority to social spending, and would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine (ridl.io/ru/ne-blok-a-mozaika-portret-rossijskih-protivnikov-vojny-v-tsifrah/).

            The second of these three groups, which he calls “the anti-war voters,” forms 14 percent of the opposition. They oppose the war, voted in 2024 but not for Putin and favor elected mayors. And the third, “anti-war non-voters” who form 41 percent of the opposition, are against the war, but did not vote in 2024 although favor elected mayors.

            These groups vary not only in their focus but also in terms of their composition and actions. The anti-war voters are disproportionately aged 40 to 49. The anti-war non-voters are mostly young. And the core opposition group in contrast to the other two is almost evenly distributed in terms of age.

            While most in all three say the war has had a negative impact on their lives, there is a significant divergence in the shares who say that “nothing has changed.” “In the narrow core and among non-voters,” Bederson says, “roughly a quarter give this answer while among the politically active anti-war voters, this figure is only six to seven percent.”

            Another importance variance among them is that nearly a third of all opponents of the war say their relatives experienced repression in Soviet times, “but among anti-war voters, the share having family memories of Soviet terror is significantly higher – 44 percent,” the Chronicles analyst reports.

            In terms of other behaviors, the three groups vary as well. The narrow core and non-voters “are considerably more likely to have helped the army and much less likely to have given aid to refugees while “among the active anti-war voters, the reverse is true: these are much less likely to have provide help for the military and much more likely to have helped refugees.

In Just 50 Years, Russia will have More Muslims than Orthodox Christians, Russian Priest Now Living in France Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 13 – If current demographic trends continue, with fertility rates among Russians significantly lower than among historically Muslim nations in that country, Hieromonk Ioann says, 50 years from now, -- that is in 2075 -- Russia will have more Muslims than Orthodox Christians and thus have the right to call itself a Muslim country.

            The Russian Orthodox priest who left Russia a year ago because of opposition to Putin’s war in Ukraine argues that in fact Russia is becoming Muslim much more rapidly than that as many who call themselves Orthodox do so are not believers believing while Muslims are far more committed (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2025/12/13/glubokaia-dukhovnaia-turbulentnost).

            He bases his conclusions on Russian census data, interior ministry reporting about attendance at religious services, and sociological studies and points out that it is the combination of ethnic Russian decline and non-Russian Muslim growth that is behind what many will view as a civilizational shift. 

            According to the priest now in emigration in France, the declining size of Russian Orthodoxy in Russia under current arrangements will be “a stimulus for the rebirth in Russia of a free Orthodox church,” a development that will allow everyone to see that the ROC MP as currently run is in fact less a church than “a form of paganism, an imperial-militarist cult.”

Putin Says Restoration of USSR Excluded Because It would ‘Critically Change’ Ethnic and Religious Composition of Russia’s Population

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 10 – Putin has often said the disintegration of the USSR was “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20^th century;” but as the editors of Nezavisimaya Gazeta observer, “he has never called for a restoration of the Soviet Union in any form” although he has said that the former republics should remain close and not link themselves to Russia’s enemies.

            Two recent statements, the editors say, explain why he has adopted that position. On the one hand, his press spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently told journalists that Putin “doesn’t want to restore the USSR because this is impossible” and “to speak about that possibility doesn’t show respect to our partners and allies in the CIS” (ng.ru/editorial/2025-12-10/2_9398_red.html).

            And on the other, in an interview with Indian journalists, Putin himself declared, the newspaper’s editors say, that the restoration of the USSR is “simply excluded” because it would “critically change both the ethnic and the religious composition of the population of the Russian Federation.” (emphasis supplied)

            Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggests that Putin has changed his vocabulary when speaking about this issue in response to the changing domestic and foreign policy situations he finds himself in, sometimes expressing more openly imperialistic and sometimes less imperialistic attitudes.

            But despite that, he has never departed from the view that the USSR cannot be restored – and now he has made clearer than ever before that his reason for advancing that view is not so much his belief that the Soviet system didn’t work but rather because a new USSR would have demographic consequences he doesn’t want – and that would lead to a further disintegration.  

            For a discussion of how that could happen and why Putin feels himself compelled to avoid setting the stage for a third round of the disintegration of the Russian state that those seeking the restoration of the USSR are unwittingly setting the stage for, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/03/putin-thinks-he-is-restoring-soviet.html.

           This is not to say, of course,  that Putin won't pursue the inclusion of parts of other countries like Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan which he believes are naturally part of Russia and whose incorporation would not change the ethnic and religious mix of the Russian Federation to a dangerous degree

Attacks on Decembrist Rising in 1825 Highlight What Putin Regime Really Fears

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 14 – Two hundred years ago, on December 14, 1825, a group of Russian army officers rose against the tsarist regime and demanded a constitution. Brutally suppressed, they nonetheless became heroes in Soviet hagiography as examples of the willingness of some Russians to protest tsarist autocracy.

            In Putin’s time, however, they have been subject to increasing attacks by Russian commentators and officials as out of touch “rebels,” Catholics and Lutherans, and their action not as something positive but as retrograde (meduza.io/paragraph/2025/12/11/dekabristy-ne-znali-svoy-narod-oni-myatezhniki-a-takzhe-katoliki-ili-lyuterane-ih-bunt-eto-regress and pointmedia.io/story/6939553ee657f59b666dce83).

            Such attacks should not be dismissed as irrelevant because they in fact highlight what the Putin regime really fears: the possibility of challenges to itself from within the elite – fears that are leading those around Putin to try to ensure that if there is any such rising, the Russian people will not support it but rather rally round those in power.  

             Because the Decembrist rising took place during an interregnum after one tsar had died and another had not yet been crowned, attacks on what they did are likely to intensify given that those around Putin are especially alarmed about the possibility that the situation will get out of hand, not as long as Putin remains in power but after he leaves the scene.  

Free Space in Russian Universities for Veterans of Putin’s War Reducing Opportunities for Others, Sparking Demands Moscow Correct This

Paul Goble

            Staunton. Dec. 11 – Vladimir Putin has ordered that veterans of his war in Ukraine be given preferential treatment in admissions to and support for higher education, a directive that is already having the effect of reducing opportunities for others, including the most gifted. Parents and politicians are outraged and some politicians and public figures are demanding changes.

            Russian director Aleksandr Sokurov complained to the Presidential Human Rights Council last month that the provision of so many slots for veterans in universities was limiting opportunities for other Russian students (absatz.media/news/142537-rossiya-mozhet-ispolzovat-golubej-kiborgov-na-fronte-naravne-s-boevymi-delfinami).

            And now Andrey Kolesnik, who earlier served in the Duma as a United Russia deputy and now works as a legislator in Kaliningrad, has called on the Russian legislature to consider increasing the number of government-subsidized slots in higher education so those that aren’t veterans could still have a chance (absatz.media/news/144327-v-gosdume-nashli-reshenie-kak-spravitsya-s-nehvatkoj-byudzhetnyh-mest-v-vuzah-iz-za-lgot-dlya-detej-bojcov-svo).

            These two complaints are likely to grow as more veterans return and occupy positions in universities and elsewhere that Russians who had not served there had expected would be available to them or their children. (On this larger problem, see business-gazeta.ru/article/689691.)

            Budgetary stringencies in Moscow make it unlikely that the Russian government will be able to meet these demands and that in turn suggests that ever more Russians will be infuriated by the privileges veterans are getting at the expense of themselves and their families, yet another source of tensions in Russia if and when Putin’s war ends. 

Former Soviet Republics Replacing Russian Toponyms but American State of Alaska Isn’t, Russia’s ‘Eastern Express’ Notes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 12 – Former Soviet republics are routinely replacing Russian place names with ones taken from their national histories while the US state of Alaska, which once was part of the Russian Empire, is not, a reflection of “the inferiority complex” many of the former republics feel but that Americans in Alaska don’t, Russia’s Eastern Express portal says.

            Alaskans, who suffer from no such complexes, the portal continues, “has preserved dozens of Russian toponyms;” and no one feels the need to change names in order to boost a new identity (asia24.media/news/pochemu-v-ssha-sokhranili-desyatki-russkikh-toponimov-a-v-stranakh-tsentralnoy-azii-pereimenovanie-u/).

            Changing the name of a city or street is “the simplest, most visible and accessible means of symbolic revenge,” something the residents of many former Soviet republics feel the need to take but that residents of the US state of Alaska clearly don’t and thus do not display a similar interest in eliminating Russian toponyms.

            An obsession with renaming, the portal continues, “reveals not confidence but insecurity if not in fact outright inadequacy. A strong and well-established identity is not afraid of the layers of history. It absorbs them and lives with them. Constantly looking back at an ‘ideologically alien’ past and fighting its ghosts is a sign that the present is still defined by negation.”

Inflation Hitting Russia’s Poor Far Harder than Those with Higher Incomes, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Documents

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 10 – Because poorer people have to spend a higher share of their incomes on the basic necessities than do those with higher incomes, it has long been recognized in Western countries that increases in prices for such necessities means that real inflation is far higher for the poor than for better off groups.

            Now, the To Be Precise portal has documented that this pattern is also true for the residents of the Russian Federation where increasingly high inflation is hurting the poorest segments of the population far harder than those with higher incomes (tochno.st/materials/na-135-vyse-byla-infliaciia-u-samyx-bednyx-po-sravneniiu-s-samymi-bogatymi-v-2024-godu).

            Because Putin’s war in Ukraine sent prices for some luxury goods skyrocketing as imports became less available and domestic produces raised their prices to take advantage of this trend, in 2022 and 2023, inflation increased more for those with higher incomes than with lower ones. But since 2024, the more typical pattern in which the poor are hurt more has returned.

            Between 2004 and 2021, prices in Russia grew more rapidly for the poor than for the better off. During that period, food prices increased 3.2 times for the poor but only 2.8 times for the rich. Then, in the first months of the war in Ukraine, that pattern was reversed but only for a relatively brief time. 

            In 2024, the last year for which statistics are available, price rises for all goods and services rose by 10.1 percent for Russia’s poorest people, but only by 8.9 percent for the richest. That means that the poor in Russia are now being confronted by a rate of inflation 13.5 percent higher than are the better off.

            This pattern helps to explain why better off groups were angrier at the Kremlin in 2022-2023 and poorer groups less so – and why that pattern likely changed in 2024. As a result, the Putin regime faces fewer questions from better off groups and more from the poorer segments of the population who in the past have been its prime supporters.